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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF U T A H
JOHN C CRITCHLOW and
SOPHIA CRITCHLOW, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
JAY L. CRITCHLOW and
LOIS CRITCHLOW, his wife;
FUNNON T. SHIMMIN and
DONNA SHIMMIN, his wife;
and VERA SHIMMIN,
Defendants and Respondents,

Case No.
13738

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
JAY L. CRITCHLOW and LOIS CRITCHLOW, his wife, and
FUNNON T. SHIMMIN and DONNA SHIMMIN, his wife.

THE NATURE OF THE CASE, DISPOSITION IN THE
DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ARE AS STATED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF
THE FACTS AS STATED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF
ARE SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT EXCEPT FOR THE
FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS AND ADDITIONS:
A. There are other access roads to the property of
Appellants (area colored green, Exhibit 1), that have been
used over the years. (Tr 80, 81, 121, 139, 255). The
Appellants contracted for the removal of timber in the
green area in 1972 and vehicles were used to haul the
timber out (Tr 81), and did not use the road in question.
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B. Critchlows did not obtain the property in green
Exhibit 1, now owned by the Appellants, until 1943 (Tr
76) and there was no road through Respondent Shimmins'
property to the green area (Appellants' present property),
until after 1948, In July of that year, Leon Chidester was
hired to improve cattle trails off the mountain into the
canyon going South from Appellants' present property
toward Price, Utah, and he was paid for this job by Shimmins, Critchlows, and others (Tr 196). H e was not hired
or paid to build a road through Shimmins' property (Tr
199). H e could not get his Jeep to the top of the ridge
(Appellants' land in green Exhibit 1), by going through
Shimmins, so he lowered the blade on his bulldozer and
cut a trail where the present road is located through
Shimmins', so that he could haul gas with his Jeep to
where his bulldozer was working. There was no road or
trail prior, at that location, until Chidester went through
with his bulldozer (Tr 189, 195, 197). Also confirmed
by testimony of Vera Shimmins (Tr 228), Jay Critchlow
(Tr 279), Sutton (Tr 211), Campbell (Tr 163, 164, 166),
Eunnon T. Shimmin (Tr 241), and Frank World (Tr 203).
C. After the bulldozer made the first trail in 1948,
through the Shimmins' property, Respondent Shimmin
then developed the road with his own equipment, at his
own expense, for his own use, and without any contribution or help from the Appellants. The Appellant, John C.
Critchlow, so testified (Tr 73). Funnon Shimmon testified that he worked on the road from 1948 to 1954 to
make it passable and has continued to maintain the road
since that time, without assistance from anyone (Tr 242,
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249, 253). Also, see the testimony of Vera Shimmin (Tr
228), and Cal Campbell (Tr 169).
.
D . The first lock on the gate No. 2, Exhibit 1, was
placed there by Appellant, John Critchlow, when he
fenced that portion of the range in about 1951, and that
lock was torn off by Shimmin and replaced with his locks
that he kept on the gate periodically from that time to the
present. Shimmin even installed his own metal gate in
1961 and took out the original gate placed in the fence by
the Appellant (Tr 250, 252, 281).
E. The gate ]Sfo. 3, Exhibit 1, was placed in the
fence constructed by Shimmin in 1953 and 1954, and was
placed there to allow cattle to exit the Shimmins' property (Tr 244), and eventually Shimmin changed the route
of the road North of the South line of Section 32, after
the line was surveyed (Tr 243), and the road reached dead
end at the Shimmin fence line and did not go through gate
No. 4 (Tr 245).
F. That before the partition suit between the Critchlow brothers, 1971, they ran their cattle and serviced
their range by going over the forty-acre tract (white area
between the green and red, Exhibit 1), owned by Mathis,
by horse back, on an exchange of use agreement with
Mathis (Tr 66, 281).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS COMPETENT EVIDENCE
FROM WHICH THE COURT FOUND THAT
THE USE OF THE ROAD ACROSS THE
SHIMMINS PROPERTY BY APPELLANTS
WAS PERMISSIVE,
To establish a Right-of-Way by prescription, the use
must be adverse and not permissive and must be under
claim of right. It has been well established by this Court
that the mere use of a roadway for twenty (20) years alone
is insufficient to establish an Easement by prescription,
but that such use must be adverse and under claim of right,
and that it cannot be adverse when it rests upon license or
mere neighborly accommodation. In Jensen vs. Gerrard,
Et. AI., 85 Utah 481, 39 P. 2d 1070, the Court stated that
the Defendants who claim a right to use a roadway by
prescription have the burden to establish such claim by
clear and satisfactory evidence, and that a 20-year use
alone, of a way, is insufficient to establish an Easement,
since the mere use of a roadway opened by a land owner
for his own purpose will be presumed permissive, and adverse use of the way cannot spring from permissive use,
and further, that the prescriptive Title must be acquired
adversely, and it cannot be adverse when it rests upon
license or mere neighborly accommodation.
To the same effect, is Sdrales, Et. Al. vs. Rondos, 116
Utah 288, 209 P. 2d 562, decided in 1949, where the Court
reaffirmed the ruling in Jensen vs. Gerrard and cited with
approval, Harkness vs. Woodmanse, 7 Utah 227, 26
P. 291, wherein the Court said, "Where a person opens a
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way for the use of his own premises and another person
uses it also, without causing damage, the presumption is,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that such use
by the latter was permissive and not under claim of right."
The Court, at that time, distinguished the facts in
Zollinger vs. Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 P. 2d 714, cited
by the Appellant, since the facts in that case showed that
the servient owner did not open the Right-of-Way for his
own use, and he used only a portion of it infrequently,
which is certainly not the facts as established in this case.
To the same effect, is Bertolina, Et. Al. vs. Frates,
Et. AL, 89 Utah 238, 57 P. 2d 348, wherein the Court
states, "A user by an individual will be considered permissive and not adverse unless there is evidence that it
was under a claim of right in himself, and that the owner,
knowing of such claim, acquiesced in it"
All of the evidence submitted to the Court in this
case is to the effect that Mr. Shimmin permitted the Appellants the use of the road and supplied them with a key
r 32,. 251, 281), as a neighborly gesture to allow them
the permissive use of his road (Tr 251, 253, 265) that he
built and maintained, (Tr 73, 169, 228, 242, 249, 253),
and at no time did he acquiesce in any claim of right in the
Plaintiffs to the use of the road.
From the time that Mr. Chidester first ran his bulldozer through the sage brush and rocks (1948), Mr. Shimmin, without assistance from the Plaintiffs in either labor
or money, and using his own equipment, developed and
5
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made the road passable for his own use. H e even built
one completely new section of the road on the South
boundary of his property, in 1952 (Tr 243, 245), over
which the Appellants now claim a Right-of-Way. Therefore, the presumption is present that the use by the Appellants was permissive and not under any claim of right.
Not only does the presumption exist, but the facts
further substantiate and show that the use was permissive,
since the Appellants used the road by obtaining a key to
the locked gate placed on the road by Shimmin in approximately 1955 and continued to use the road thereafter by
use of the key supplied by Shimmin (Tr 251, 253, 281),
and even called him and requested a key, in 1972 (Tr 254),
which clearly shows that they used the road by his permission and not under any claim of right or adversely.
They were not free to use the road as they pleased, but
only to use the road if they had a key supplied to them by
Mr. Shimmin. Any gates placed across the road were
established for Mr. Shimmin's use and not in any recognition of any right in the Plaintiffs.
The case of Rippentrop vs. Pickering, 15 Utah 2d
59, 387 P. 2d 94, decided in 1963, affirmed the prior
holding of the Court in Lunt vs. Kitchens, 123 Utah 488,
260 P. 2d 535, which case stated as follows:
"If, of course, the landowner consents to the use
of his land, then the right created is a license and
a prescriptive right cannot arise from a license unless the licensee renounces openly his claim under
the license."
However, it is obvious that where a special relationship such as a license exists, the owner of the
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land is entitled to more notice than the mere use
, of his land not inconsistent with the license. Thus
it is said in the Restatement of Property #458J:
*'Where a use of land and one having an interest
affected by the use have a relationship to each
other sufficient in itself to justify the use, the use
is not adverse unless knowledge of its adverse
character is had by the one whose interest is affected. The responsibility of bringing this knowledge
to him lies in the Qne making the use."
No evidence was presented to the Court that the
Appellants claimed a right to use the road adverse to the
interest of Shimmin or that Shimmin at any time ever
had any notice or knowledge that the Appellants claimed
a right adverse to Shimmin, until 1968, when Shimmin
received the letter from the Appellants' then Attorney,
Luke G. Pappas (Exhibit 17), who wanted to discuss the
use of the road with Shimmin. At that time, Appellants
were told and informed that they were using the road by
permission and as a neighborly accommodation, and that
there was nothing to negotiate (Tr 254).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN ITS FAILURE TO DECREE
THAT APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A
.-•*•• WAY OF NECESSITY OVER THE PROPERTY OF THE RESPONDENTS CRITCHLOW.
At the opening of the Trial it was Stipulated that
none of the property partitioned to the Plaintiffs in the
partition suit (Defendants' Exhibit 21) is contiguous to
that which was partitioned to the Respondents Critchlow (Tr 6).
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A "way of necessity" over the property of the Respondents Critchlow being entirely dependent upon the
question of whether the Plaintiffs have a prescriptive easement over the property of the Respondent Shimmin; and
the Trial Court, having heard and observed the witnesses
of the respective parties, and weighed their testimony; and
the Court having concluded, from a preponderance of the
evidence that Plaintiffs' use of the alleged roadway over
the property of the Respondents Shimmin was permissive,
and not adverse, hostile, notorious or antagonistic to the
rights of the Respondents Shimmin; and that Plaintiffs
failed to establish a right of way over the lands of the Respondents Shimmin by prescription or otherwise; the Trial
Court could not find and conclude otherwise than that
the Plaintiffs were not entitled to a "way of necessity"
over the lands of the Respondents Critchlow.
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN FAILING TO AWARD DAMAGE
The Appellants not only failed to establish any Rightof-Way, but failed to prove any damage. The Appellants
put on evidence of expense incurred in moving their cattle
to another area, but did not show that they suffered any
damage or loss. They may have made a profit as a result
of the move. All cattle operations have expense, but they
are not all losses.
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CONCLUSION
The Trial Court had sufficient and adequate evidence
presented to it from which a finding could be made that
the use of the alleged roadway over the Shimmins' property was permissive; that no "way of necessity" over the
Respondents Critchlow was acquired; and that Appellants
failed to establish any damage.
Respectfully submitted,
BOYD BUNNELL
Attorney for DefendantsRespondents FUNNON T.
SHIMMIN and DONNA
SHIMMIN
Oliveto Building
Price, Utah 84501
S. J. SWEETRING
Attorney for DefendantsRespondents JAY L. CRITCHLOW
and LOIS CRITCHLOW
Oliveto Building
Price, Utah 84501
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